NATO – the Continuing Course of ‘Trump-driven Summitry’

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So the ‘24 hour’ summit parade – or should I say the Trump performance spectacle – continues. We saw his 24 hour star performance at the G7 Summit at Kananaskis – kept in line by Canada’s new prime minister Mark Carney; and now we played the audience to the 24 hour NATO summit choreographed by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

And now to his ‘star performance’ in the Hague at the NATO Summit. The event as we found out was finely tuned by the Secretary-General Mark Rutte including ending it after just 1 day to avoid, I presume, having Trump loudly leave the gathering early. Now in no way do I want to be dismissive of Rutte’s really excellent framing for the meeting. The marshalling of support was clearly described by our friends at the NYTimes:

“Mr. Rutte is skilled at handling Mr. Trump and has no embarrassment about flattering him. In an unusually unctuous message that Mr. Trump released on Tuesday, Mr. Rutte praised him for making Europe “pay in a BIG way” on increased military spending and for his “decisive action in Iran, that was truly extraordinary, and something no one else dared to do.””

 

“To try to ensure a smooth summit, Mr. Rutte said: “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe, and the world,” getting allies to commit to spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. “You will achieve something NO American president in decades could get done,” Mr. Rutte added. NATO officials confirmed that the message, which Mr. Trump posted on social media, was authentic.”

The self congratulation was all about the commitment to raise defense spending demanded by Trump. And to be fair, objectively Trump’s insistence on greater defense spending efforts by NATO members was long overdue, especially in the light of continuing Russian actions against Ukraine and worries by Eastern European countries close to Russia. But even the agreement to move to 5 percent of GDP had a ‘sleight of hand’ at play as pointed to by the The Economist:

“The solution was two-fold. One trick was to stretch the timeline for meeting the target. Many states had pushed for 2032, with steady annual increases to get there. Others, though, under greater fiscal pressure—and not just Spain—pushed for 2035. In the end, regrettably, the laggards won, though allies are supposed to submit annual plans showing a “credible, incremental path” to the target, and will be subject to a bigger review in 2029.”

 

“The problem is that Russia is rebuilding its armed forces faster than previously thought. It had been assumed that it would take Russia seven years after any ceasefire in Ukraine to reconstitute its forces to the level needed for a confrontation with NATO. “The general assessment now should be five years,” one senior NATO official told The Economist. “Let’s not kid ourselves,” complains Dovile Sakaliene, Lithuania’s defence minister, suggesting that Russia could attack before the new spending turned up. “2035 is after the [next] war.””

Well kinda pandering but otherwise NATO leaders would likely have faced a growling and very unhappy Trump. The victim here, though, Ukraine. The Hague Summit Declaration is all of 5 paragraphs. And buried in paragraph 3 is the following:

“Allies reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine, whose security contributes to ours, and, to this end, will include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry when calculating Allies’ defence spending.”

So, no clear condemnation of Russian aggression, no heartfelt declaration of support and determination to provide weapons needed by Ukraine, no upping sanctions but rather a tie in to the overall agreed spending increase by all NATO nations – skip Spain – to 5 percent of GDP. Wow. Steven Erlanger, the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, at the NYTimes underscored the muting of Ukrainian support:

“But it [the Declaration] makes no mention of NATO’s promise of eventual membership to Ukraine and Georgia, as previous summit communiqués have done. Past commitments, Mr. Rutte has explained with some exasperation, are considered settled and do not need to be repeated.”

So, Trump has succeeded in contorting – or at least reshaping – the Nato Summit to mirror and match his, Trump’s interests and quite frankly that is it. As pointed out in WPR:

“That solicitousness is in some ways understandable. During his first term, Trump made no effort to hide his disdain and even hostility toward the alliance, which he has portrayed as a way for wealthy European states to freeride on U.S. defense spending, with little to no benefit to Washington. Moreover, Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on his commitment to Article 5. And when it comes to the principal threat now facing the alliance’s European members—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—Trump has adopted many of Moscow’s talking points, while curtailing U.S. support for Kyiv.”

And as for Article 5 – the collective security provision for the NATO members – the ‘heart’ of the alliance – with Trump at the helm I wouldn’t really want to put it to the test.

Indeed as the Economist somewhat startlingly described it relying on the words of Nato’s Mark Rutte:

“The tone was that of a parent congratulating a toddler. “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe and the world,” wrote Mark Rutte, the secretary-general of NATO, in a text message to Donald Trump, America’s president. Europe is going to pay in a BIG way, as they should, and it will be your win.””

So what is the state of alliance relations following this seeming Trump ‘love fest’. Here is how WPR described the current state of alliance relations:

“Neither Trump’s calls for increased European defense spending nor European calls for increased strategic autonomy were anything new. But the sense of being under threat from both the east, in the form of Russian revanchism, and the west, in the form of U.S. retrenchment, for a moment seemed to create an urgency that was unprecedented.”

In the end Trump seemed satisfied by it all. Why wouldn’t he be. But a rather more insightful view was expressed by the President of the Czech Republic and recorded in the NYTimes:

“The president of the Czech Republic, Petr Pavel, a former general, put it well last week when he summarized his outlook for the summit.

 

On the one hand, he said, expectations for the summit are high, especially for new targets for military spending, but the goals are also limited because of the U.S. administration’s “approach.””

Great fanfare; much Trump performance; but far less than meets the eye.

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/nato-the-continuing-course-of-trump

Image Credit: France24

 

From EAF – ‘Trump’s disruption in Canada leaves the G7 at a crossroads”

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Sorry for the Post’s delay. The following is a Post prepared for the East Asia Forum (EAF) on the recently concluded G7 Summit hosted by Canada in Kananaskis. It appeared today at EAF Sunday June 22, 2025.

Trump’s disruption in Canada leaves the G7 at a crossroads

Still in Search of Middle Power Leadership

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In a world of continuing geopolitical tensions, myself and colleagues from CWD have been determined to probe into the role(s) of Middle Powers (MPs) and to describe Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) all in the hopes of uncovering how MPs might assist in stabilizing international relations and the current global order.

Back in December I took my first crack at the subject with this Alan’s Newsletter Substack Post – ‘A Start on Middle Powers and Their Diplomacy’. Also, CWD, then ‘China-West Dialogue’ and now, perhaps, ‘Changing World Dialogue’ called on some of our expert compatriots to examine MPs and MPD in a variety of settings.

As I wrote then:

“So, where did we look? We in fact used the fall of 2024 to showcase a number of possible MPs and to examine the policies and political behaviors followed. At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions:

 

· Our lead off was on Japan with Mike Mochizuki (GWU) as the Lead Organizer;

· then Active Non-Alignment with Latin America, led by Jorge Heine (BU) and former Ambassador for Chile as the Lead Organizer;

· South Korea with Yul Sohn (Yonsei University) as the Lead Organizer;

· Turkey with Guven Sak (Tepav) as the Lead Organizer;

· Australia and New Zealand with Shiro Armstrong (ANU/EAF) as Lead Organizer assisted by our own Richard Carey (OECD Alumnus); and

· Indonesia and ASEAN with Maria Monica Wihardja (ISEAS) as the Lead Organizer.”

Why focus on these global order actors? Well, as I suggested at the time:

“Then we were interested in what influence, or potential influence these MPs expressed in the growing global order/disorder – growing tensions between the United States and China and the unremitting regional conflicts in the Middle East and Europe. Where, if anywhere, were MPs influencing international relations and enhancing, perhaps, international stability and advancing global governance actions especially in such critical areas as climate transition, climate finance, debt management, global financial regulation and more? These efforts, we anticipated, could stabilize global relations in the face of current damaging international actions and the sour relations held by the leading powers, China and the US. We were determined to look at MPs, especially with the return of a US Trump administration and the possible significant impact of Trump 2.0 on global order stability.”

This past weekend I was reminded of MP presence and action in a piece in the Toronto Star by a colleague from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, Joseph Wong. These days Joe teaches at the Munk School but he also serves as Vice President International at the University. Just recently he wrote this piece titled, “Rise of the middle powers. Here’s how Canada can wean itself off of U.S. dependence”. Wong’s focus, not surprisingly, was on Canada and the role of MPs in shaping the global economy and strengthening democratic practices but Joe saw Canada’s actions in the face of Trump 2.0 as part of a larger MP picture to weaken the negative impact of major powers in the larger global order. As he wrote:

“As leaders of the G7 countries prepare to meet in Kananaskis next week, middle power nations, such as Canada, need to step up and take on leadership roles in restructuring the global economy, shoring up democratic practices internationally and investing in talent to boost productivity and innovation at home.”

 

“The simultaneous efforts by industrial economies to diversify their foreign economic relations have the potential to restructure the world economy. Each of these economies on its own may be a middle power, but together, they represent a sizable portion of the global economy.”

 

“Imagine if each of these middle powers reduced their trade dependence on the U.S.by just 10 per cent and made up that deficit by solidifying alternative trade partners and building up new and more resilient supply chains. Together they could collectively rewire the circuitry of the global economy for the long-term.”

So the Wong piece was a reminder of the potential influence of yes, MPs. And my on again off again MP focus was reignited. It is evident as this Post unfolds that MP action is on the minds of many of my colleagues as we see the aggressive policies of Trump 2.0. Mathias Jobelius, the Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s office in New York just recently wrote a piece that examined the undermining of the key multilateral institution the UN now entering its 80th year. Jobelius assessed the state of multilateralism in an IPS piece, titled: “Unfinished Business”. In that piece he raised the question of whether multilateralism could continue to exist in an emerging multipolar world. He answered in the positive and declared this:

“The answer is ‘Yes’. The basics are all in place. The overwhelming majority of countries would like a rules-based order and support the principles of the UN Charter, even if they resist its selective application.”

And how could this be achieved, Jobelius turned to MPs:

“This needs to be utilised — for example, by creating an alliance of medium-sized powers. If 20 large middle powers from all continents with a commitment to multilateralism were to join forces, they would carry enough weight to counter the big power politics and strengthen the multilateral order.”

Continuing the MP narrative, my colleague Bruce Jones from Brookings and a number of his compatriots, Ravi Agrawal, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Karin von Hippel, Lynn Kuok and Susana Malcorra identified the critical role for such MPs in a piece these authors, did for the World Economic Forum (WEF) White Paper compendium titled: “Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World” that was published in January 2024. Their chapter, is titled, “Global Security “Cooperation” in an age of distrust and insecurity: Managing distrust and forging responses despite it necessitates new approaches that include establishing new partnership mechanisms”. In the piece they acknowledge the growing conflict in the international system:

“The international system has never been free of violence and inequity. Yet today, as violence is rising, order is eroding and the spectre of nuclear war is casting its menacing shadow, greater urgency – and creativity – is needed to reduce the risk of conflict.”

Part of their solution as offered in the piece includes the creation of a an institution that is built in part on MPs, what they describe as a “middle/major powers” grouping – an M-10 (or similar), as these authors call it. And what is that:

S“At this moment of intense need, a standing mechanism that links the western major and middle powers with the non-Western ones (Brazil, India, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) would create a diplomatic mechanism that could straddle the increasingly bifurcated worlds of the G7, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, plus newly admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).”

 

“The proposed grouping – a kind of “coalition of the capable” – would have the diplomatic flexibility and heft to raise the costs to the great powers for actions or behaviour that seriously undermined the multilateral order and the quiet diplomatic channels to help find de-escalatory off-ramps and similar mechanisms.”

 

“Within this, there should be a “middle powers mediation group” on issues like Russia/Ukraine. Unlike the various unilateral peace initiatives attempted to date, a middle-powers grouping with cross-regional representation would have the diplomatic weight, the range of perspectives and the combined geopolitical clout to change the terms of debate around viable pathways to war termination and a stable peace.”

So, MPs could as they see it buttress the impaired multilateral system. Good and sensible ideas but yet we do not see such initiatives at least in this moment of the global order. Unfortunately, in fact, there are MP initiatives that have not ‘taken off’ as I found out. Let me just mention one that seemed significantly promising: the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’. I was quite taken with this initiative and focused on it in my chapter in Lim Wonhyuk’s edited volume for Brooking’s, Unfinished Transformation: Domestic Politics and International Relations since the Covid-19 Pandemic”. at that time with my chapter, “The Possibilities for “Effective Multilateralism” in the Coming Global Order”. The initiative seemed to me as a major MP effort. As I then described it in the chapter:

(P. 124)* “What may be helpful, in fact, is a designation recently proposed by the cur­rent French foreign minister, Jean­ Yves Le Drain, along with the German foreign minister, Heiko Maas. In 2019, these foreign ministers launched the new “Alliance for Multilateralism,” tied to the United Nations. The leaders and the participants in this alliance are not referred to as middle powers, but the host and cohost countries and the participants are all designated as “goodwill pow­ers.” This designation emphasizes the collective action purpose of this contemporary multilateralism. There is no reference to “middle powers,” or powers generally, which, as I have just pointed out, is rather misleading in any case. Thus, “goodwill powers” may be a useful term. We will come back to the idea of goodwill powers as we explore “effective multilateralism” in the final section.”

 

(P. 127) “Let us return for a moment to the Alliance for Multilateralism. It appears as yet to be another instance of effective multilateral effort in the contempo­rary global order. As pointed out above, this initiative was launched by the foreign ministers of France and Germany. Its initial meeting was on April 2, 2019, in New York during the German UN Security Council Presidency. It was followed by a meeting on September 26, held during the High-Level Week at the UN General Assembly. The meeting was called by Germany and France and was cohosted by Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Ghana. Forty­ eight countries participated in this September gathering.”

 

(P. 128) “The goals, as declared by the Alliance, are:

· to protect and preserve international norms, agreements and institu­tions that are under pressure or in peril;

· to pursue a more proactive agenda in policy areas that lack effective gov­ernance and where new challenges require collective action; and

· to advance reforms, without compromising on key principles and values, in order to make multilateral institutions and the global political and economic order more inclusive and effective in delivering tangible results to citizens around the world.

The Alliance also makes a point of identifying its outreach to nonstate actors as stakeholders and partners for the challenges the Alliance faces. The Alliance has held four meetings since its creation. These gatherings sought to promote, among other things:

· improved governance for the digital world. The Alliance bolstered support for the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace;

· implementation of international humanitarian law to protect the work of humanitarian workers and space for humanitarian action and support for the fight against impunity, at the opening of the session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on February 24, 2020; and

· support for the central role of the World Health Organization in the man­agement of COVID­19.”

The Alliance for Multilateralism seemed like a dramatic instance of real world MP action and MPD. But it appears as though the network did not survive its initiation.

I suspect, and others seem to suspect as well that the Informals – the G7, the G20 and the BRICS+ – might provide the environment for possible MP action. And indeed just as I was finishing off this Post – sorry for this rather unusually lengthy Post – I was met with a piece that does exactly that. So my good colleague John Ikenberry from Princeton and some of his colleagues, Victor Cha, from CSIS and Georgetown University and John Hamre from CSIS just published in Foreign Affairs, “How Global Governance Can Survive With the Right Reforms, the G-7 Can Sustain the Rules-Based Order.” There they see the prospect for global governance action from the G7:

“The body that develops solutions to today’s global problems must becomposed of governments that trust each other, share similar values,possess significant economic and political power, and have a trackrecord of working together. This is where the G-7 comes in.”

 

“But the G-7 can aim for meaningful action that sustains global order. By coordinating their economic, development, security, energy, and technology policies, its members can impose sanctions to deter conflict, set rules and norms to keep pace with technological innovation, punish predatory economic behavior, support democratic governance, combat disinformation, and help the developing world with food security and labor standards.”

The problem, however, as I see it in their focus on the G7 is that their hope for such action requires altering the current membership and the ways that it currently operates. As they say:

“Before they can play this role, however, the G-7 must be overhauled.”

It seems to me that effective action by MPs or MPs plus some major powers possibly can only occur on an informal basis otherwise we are back to, dare I say it, UN reform. Realistically, changes of the sort proposed by John and his colleagues are unfortunately unlikely to happen. Still a focus on the Informals with the G7 occuring on June 15-17th in Canada, the BRICS+ Summit scheduled for July 6-7th in Rio de Janeiro and G20 Summit in Johannesburg on November 22-23rd, all are worth watching closely for signs of MP and possibly beyond MP collective action. We will certainly be watching and reporting.

The Post appeared originally at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/still-in-search-of-middle-power-leadership

*The page numbers are used here as there is no digital version of the Lim Wonhyuk volume, as I mentioned in an earlier Substack Post.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Leadership, or Possibly Plurilateral Collective Action? Hmmmm

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We’ve been raising over recent Posts, well at least one, the evident diminishing of multilateralism in today’s global order – with consequences of course. We’ve raised the concern that many, if not most of the formal multilateral institutions starting with the UN and the IFIs and the many specialized agencies have struggled to advance global governance policies. I have been contemplating this since my Substack colleague Peter Singer wrote a Post (‘UN leadership: relentlessly focused on results?’) followed up with another Post, ‘How Should Bill Gates Spend $200 Billion?’ Especially with the former Post, Peter targeted UN leadership – especially in light of upcoming leadership changes including a new Secretary General. In his Substack, ‘Global Health Insights’, he wrote:

“A key lever is leadership. Over the next three years, (at least) three major UN bodies will select (or elect) new leaders: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2025, the UN Secretariat in 2026, and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2027. The future of the UN may well hinge on whether these new leaders possess one crucial characteristic: a relentless focus on results.”

 

“Each of these organizations plays a vital role in advancing the UN’s mission, from tackling global poverty (UNDP) to global health (WHO), to peace and security and coordination of the UN system (UN). Yet despite their importance, the UN system has often struggled to deliver timely, measurable outcomes—an issue exacerbated by dwindling trust and funding. With Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) badly lagging and support for the UN increasingly under threat, the need for results-focused leadership is more urgent than ever.”

 

“The UN desperately needs leaders who are singularly focused on delivering measurable results. Without results, there is no trust; without trust, there is no funding. Results must be the cornerstone of any leadership candidacy.”

Now Peter has been much closer to some of these multilateral institutions than I have so I suspect he has seen leadership up close. But I still worry that national commitment to advance collective action remains the heart of the current global governance problem.

I was struck by this example, recently. This is the effort to conclude a Plastics Treaty. A multilateral agreement on such a Treaty was to have been concluded at Busan Korea last year. It wasn’t. So let’s take a look. Patrick Schroeder is now at Chatham House in the UK, and before that a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and even earlier he was based in Beijing, where he worked extensively on development cooperation programmes for the European Union and climate change initiatives with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) on the question of the Treaty. As Schroder pointed out in his piece at Chatham House, late in 2024 titled, “The failed Busan negotiations show good science and flexibility are needed to secure a plastics treaty”:

“The Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee on Plastic Pollution (INC) had a clear mandate from the United Nations Environment Assembly in 2022 to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2024. However, the lengthy and complex process was marked by intense debates and competing national interests.”

The problem as he pointed out:

“In the final phase, two major country blocs emerged. A larger group of over 100 nations supported a comprehensive approach to end plastic pollution.”

This larger group sought to:

“… include limiting upstream production of plastic polymer feedstocks and harmful chemicals used in plastics, while not restricting the treaty’s scope to the sustainable design of products and waste management.”

But there was a smaller group:

“A smaller but influential bloc, consisting of fossil-fuel producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, resisted efforts to include measures regulating upstream production. This division created significant tension and stalled progress.”

 

“Production caps have been identified by scientists as a key mechanism to reduce plastic pollution. Modeling by the University of California Berkeley shows that a cap on global virgin plastic production at 2020 levels would yield a reduction of mismanaged plastic waste in 2050 from 121 to 72 Mt.”

The result according to Schroeder:

“A deadlock over the proposed Article 6 on production caps or reduction of primary plastics production has left the negotiations at an impasse that threatens meaningful progress.”

 

“The lack of willingness to compromise on both sides and inability to find common ground poses a significant risk to the effectiveness of the negotiations. Without a pathway to reconcile differing priorities, the risk increases of a fragmented agreement or outright failure.”

 

“Such rigidity not only delays progress but also erodes the spirit of collaboration necessary to tackle global challenges such as plastic pollution, setting a dangerous precedent for future negotiations on critical environmental issues.”

And now look at the continuing reporting of multilateral results for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As IISD reports for the annual High Level Panel Forum (HLPF) due this coming July:

“Titled, ‘Progress Towards the Sustainable Development Goals,’ the May 2025 report uses inputs from more than 50 international and regional organizations to assess progress made since 2015 against the global SDG indicator framework. It finds that the world is on track to meet or is making “moderate” progress on 35% of the 137 SDG targets with available data. It also shows that progress on 47% of the targets is insufficient, and 18% of the targets have regressed from the 2015 baseline. The report “reaffirms the imperative to intensify efforts to reverse these trends” in the five years that remain until the 2030 deadline.”

 

“To “reverse alarming trends and consolidate hard-won gains,” the report calls for urgent action around six “collectively agreed-upon” transitions to drive transformative change: food systems; energy access and affordability; digital connectivity; education; jobs and social protection; and climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.”

 

“Highlighting sustainable development as a core pillar of multilateral cooperation, as reaffirmed by the Political Declaration of the 2023 SDG Summit and the 2024 Pact for the Future, the report underscores that “[s]ustained multilateral engagement is essential to keep the SDGs within reach.”

Is UN leadership the central issue – possibly, but the central focus does seem to me to lie with collective national action. And it may be that something less than full multilateral collective action may be a start to the answer. Thus a subset of the full multilateral group, a plurilateral group of members, could gather and agree amongst themselves on agreed percentage cuts to imports for these plurilateral members. Begin the process and aid in the transition away from plastics. And as for the SDGs, a plurilateral group of members could announce enhanced targets for the group of six “collectively agreed-upon” transitions. These are just two collective action moves. I am sure there are significant others and I would additionally suggest bringing on board as many of the G20 members – we know the Trump US will not – but others may act collectively and possibly initiate and commence action by significant subset of this key Informal.

Consensus needs to be set aside for the moment. For now in this fractured global order creative plurilateral effort is, I think, a key to moving collective global governance action. Action is required, and I anticipate, build on itself. It starts though with forward action even if we start with plurilateralism.

This orinally appeared as a Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/leadership-or-possibly-plurilateral

 

Faltering Multilateralism: Today, Let’s Start with Trade

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It would be hard to make this stuff up. When I was deep into trade policy issues in the late 80s and early 90’s before China’s accession to the WTO, I could not have imagined a President using these trade policies to enact such broad-based tariffs. And it seems like that is how the CIT – the Court of International Trade, sees Trump tariff efforts as well.

Now I was going to dive into a just recently released book by Brookings edited by my longstanding colleague, Lim Wonhyuk from South Korea (Korea) titled: “Unfinished Transformation: Domestic Politics and International Relations Since the Covid-19 Pandemic”. Wonhyuk is the editor and I have a chapter in the volume – “The possibilities for “Effective Multilateralism” in the Coming Global Order. There are a variety of pieces in the book from some rather notable folk including: Kent Calder, David Lampton, Zia Qureshi, Norman Ornstein and my good colleague, Homi Kharas. And I will return to the just released book though unfortunately there does not appear to be a current digital version at this time. But I cannot let this CIT decision pass without comment.

Yes, so, the CIT ruled just last evening (Wednesday) and according to the NYTimes and Tony Romm and Ana Swanson, this was the conclusion reached:

“The U.S. Court of International Trade said the president had overstepped his authority in imposing his “reciprocal” tariffs globally, as well as levies on Canada and Mexico.”

What the Court has declared as illegal then are the “worldwide and retaliatory tariffs,” in other words, the 10 percent tariffs on all trading partners and also the reciprocal tariffs that President Trump paused for 90 days in order to negotiate trade deals with a host of trade partners. What remains in place for the moment are tariffs on specific products, such as those that were placed on steel, aluminum and automobiles. As pointed out in the NYTimes piece:

“The ruling, by the U.S. Court of International Trade, delivered an early yet significant setback to Mr. Trump, undercutting his primary leverage as he looks to pressure other nations into striking trade deals more beneficial to the United States.”

Paul Krugman in his Substack today pointed out what many trade types had been thinking all along:

“The thing is, it has been obvious all along that Trump’s use of the 1977 International Economic Emergency Powers Act to justify Smoot-Hawley level tariffs was a massive abuse of power. I mean, since when are 4 percent unemployment and 2.5 percent inflation an emergency justifying the reversal of 90 years of policy? But I guess I just assumed that things like that didn’t matter anymore.”

How did it reach this point? Well, this is how the NYTimes reporters described it:

“But Mr. Trump adopted a novel interpretation of its powers as he announced, and then suspended, high levies on scores of countries in April. He also used the law to impose tariffs on products from Canada and Mexico in return for what he said was their role in sending fentanyl to the United States.”

 

“On Wednesday, the Court of International Trade, the primary federal legal body overseeing such matters, found that Mr. Trump’s tariffs “exceed any authority granted” to the president by the emergency powers law. Ruling in separate cases brought by states and businesses, a bipartisan panel of three judges essentially declared many, but not all, of Mr. Trump’s tariffs to have been issued illegally.”

 

“It was not clear precisely when and how the tariff collections would grind to a halt. The ruling gave the executive branch up to 10 days to complete the bureaucratic process of ending them. The Trump administration immediately filed its plans to appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”

At least for the moment the signature policy of this second Trump administration appears ‘cooked’. It will be interesting to see what Trump does next for it seems unlikely that Trump will give up on his most preferred policy – tariffs.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/faltering-multilateralism-today-lets

 

Multilateralism: It is Just Largely Talk Now

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While you will see that the main focus of this Substack is on multilateralism, and its current failure, I couldn’t let Trump’s disrespect for the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa pass without some comment. Once again in the Oval Office, as described in the NYTimes,  Trump let his lack of understanding, his lack of facts rule the day. It showed the absolute worst of Trump. The American people should be ashamed that a leader is willing to so distort US relations with potentially friendly leaders:

“In an astonishing confrontation in the Oval Office on Wednesday, President Trump lectured President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa with false claims about a genocide against white Afrikaner farmers, even dimming the lights to show what he said was video evidence of their persecution.”

 

“The meeting had been expected to be tense, given that Mr. Trump has suspended all aid to the country and created an exception to his refugee ban for Afrikaners, fast-tracking their path to citizenship even as he keeps thousands of other people out.”

 

“But the meeting quickly became a stark demonstration of Mr. Trump’s belief that the world has aligned against white people, and that Black people and minorities have received preferential treatment. In the case of South Africa, that belief has ballooned into claims of genocide.”

One last point, a good point it appears, though still somewhat uncertain, Trump will attend, apparently,  the G20 Summit gathering in November in South Africa. As reported in the NYTimes: 

“South Africa presented a framework for a trade deal, the president said, and the two sides agreed to hold further discussions to iron out the specifics of an agreement. He said that Mr. Trump indicated that he would attend the Group of 20 summit in Johannesburg in November, despite suggestions by his administration that the United States might skip it.” 

 So now back to today’s main subject, multilateralism. Back in December 2024 in a Substack Post here at Alan’s Newsletter, “Focusing on the Future – Where are we on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and some other things?” I leaned on Homi Kharas, my good colleague at Brookings to give me some hope that states, many states, were turning to focus on the sustainable development goals (SDGs). And Homi and some of his colleagues did. As I wrote at the time: 

“Even more pointedly, Homi suggested that a vein of optimism was called for. The reason: technology could provide the necessary fillip to efforts to achieve the SDGs. Under the header, “ Technology is finally delivering on its promise to make major economic production and consumption structures more sustainable””  

While that may be the case for some it is clearly not the case for the second Trump administration. As Dashveenjit Kaurashveenjit Kaur wrote rather depressingly this last March in Sustainability News: 

“The US has officially rejected the UN Sustainable Development Goals, citing sovereignty concerns and claiming a mandate from voters to prioritise American interests over global frameworks.” 

 

“When world leaders gathered at the United Nations headquarters in New York in September 2015, they created what many called a “blueprint for a better future” – the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Then-president Obama pledged American commitment to the ambitious 15-year roadmap designed to transform our world by 2030.” 

 

“This week, and the United States has executed a stunning, although not unexpected about-face: the Trump administration has declared it now “rejects and denounces” these very same global objectives, becoming what appears to be the first nation to abandon the framework since its unanimous adoption.” 

 

“The consequential announcement arrived not through a high-profile press conference or presidential statement. Still, it nested in diplomatic remarks delivered by Edward Heartney, Minister Counselor to ECOSOC at the US Mission to the United Nations.” 

 

““Put simply, globalist endeavours like Agenda 2030 and the SDGs lost at the ballot box,” Heartney stated in the prepared remarks. “Therefore, the United States rejects and denounces the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, and it will no longer reaffirm them as a matter of course.”” 

Now maybe this declaration from a mid-level bureaucrat can ultimately be swept away if the Trump administration changes its mind – as we’ve seen it wouldn’t be the first occasion for sure, still the statement is rather chilling and appears to meaningfully undermine the multilateral effort that to this point not very successfully, notwithstanding two recent UN summits that focused wholly or in part on on the SDGs. 

This episode is just a small part of the growing acknowledgement that the heart of multilateralism, the UN and its many specialized agencies are failing. Many of us concerned with global stability and order focus a fair amount on the numerous multilateral efforts. But there does seem to be a certain amount of denial going on. 

Now, in this context of faltering multilateralism, I was attracted by the recent piece penned by my colleague, Peter Singer. Peter among other things writes the Substack Global Health Insights.   Now Peter was special adviser to the director general of the World Health Organization from 2017 to 2023. He  is today emeritus professor of medicine at the University of Toronto and a former chief executive of Grand Challenges Canada. Peter understands the faltering UN effort. As he posted recently at his Substack, in a piece titled, “UN leadership: relentlessly focused on results?”: 

“Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has recently taken to tweeting, “The mission of the UN is more urgent than ever.” This is certainly true, but not in its current version — replete with process and plans. There is, of course, a reform initiative, called UN80; however, it seems more focused on managerial efficiency and restructuring than results. The UN needs a new mission: Get Stuff Done.” 

With the current round of new leadership appointments,  Peter turns to leadership, and its central importance: 

“Yet despite their importance, the UN system has often struggled to deliver timely, measurable outcomes—an issue exacerbated by dwindling trust and funding. With Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) badly lagging and support for the UN increasingly under threat, the need for results-focused leadership [emphasis added] is more urgent than ever.” 

 

“The UN desperately needs leaders who are singularly focused on delivering measurable results. Without results, there is no trust; without trust, there is no funding. Results must be the cornerstone of any leadership candidacy.” 

If leadership is key, then, Peter points to critical upcoming opportunities for the UN system and what is necessary for the incoming leadership: 

“A key lever is leadership. Over the next three years, (at least) three major UN bodies will select (or elect) new leaders: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2025, the UN Secretariat in 2026, and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2027. The future of the UN may well hinge on whether these new leaders possess one crucial characteristic: a relentless focus on results.” 

 

“Results must be the cornerstone of any leadership candidacy.”

 

“This results focus is fully compatible with other perspectives that will drive these elections, such as gender and regional representation.” 

 

“Having had experience with a UN agency election and tried (and not fully succeeded) to help transform a UN agency into one that prioritizes results above all, I witnessed firsthand the barriers that make implementing a results-focused strategy difficult.” 

So as Peter portrays it what is necessary for successful multilateralism is leadership dedicated to results that can be shown. Only with this will trust be built and with trust, according to Peter, funding will be forthcoming. With that in hand, he then targets the current effort to choose new leadership:

“This is the acid test. Leaders who have a proven track record of achieving tangible outcomes are more likely to replicate that success at the UN. The UN is awash with process. But there is a gap between planning and execution.” … 

 

“In addition to personal examples, candidates should be able to provide compelling analysis and tangible solutions for improving measurable results at the agency they wish to lead.” … 

 

“From my experience, two elements are essential to fast-tracking progress: innovation and data.” … 

 

“Effective governance is even more important than management. Leaders must work with governing bodies to improve the results focus of the organization. UN governance tends to focus more on planning and process than on execution and results.” … 

 

“Changing the culture of an organization is key to making results-focused strategy, management, or governance sustainable. UN organizations tend to be highly hierarchical, which means leadership has an outsized impact on culture.” … 

 

“As member states, civil society, and donors engage in these critical leadership selections, they must champion candidates who are relentlessly focused on results. The future of the UN depends on it.”

And with that Peter concludes: 

“Nevertheless, imagine a UN system where, in five years, every agency is led by someone relentlessly focussed on results and on getting things done. It would be a very different—and far more effective and sustainable —UN than the one we see today.” 

The ‘pitch’ for critical leadership is sensible and important especially in the context of upcoming leadership searches and appointments. But I remain hesitant to accept that this will ‘turn this ship around’.   It seems to me that in the end the critical element remains national effort and the determination for members to forge collective policy whether health policy, climate change whatever. As Gordon La Forge. 2025 in his piece,  “The U.N. Is Still the Best Forum to Tackle AI Governance”. Reminds us in his recent piece in WPR:

“The late Richard Holbrooke once quipped that blaming the U.N. for international dysfunction is like faulting Madison Square Garden when the Knicks lose. Put another way, the U.N. continues to struggle with what could be called the 193-body problem: Nation-states are the world’s dominant form of political organization, but they are neither well-equipped to solve planetary challenges nor designed to defend the best interests of humanity as a whole, which often conflict with national imperatives.” 

It may require ‘coalitions of the willing’ to press ahead with new leadership on advancing critical and necessary policy. We cannot let the 193-body problem of the UN, or the ‘big boys’ problem, US, China and Russia to torpedo critical policy efforts. It is time to end just the talk. Using a plurilateral approach to push forward is critical though possibly incomplete. More on that soon. 

Credit Image: UN Dispatch

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://substack.com/home/post/p-164155148

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A Tribute to Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Multilateralism Threatened: The G20 in South Africa

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He passed on May 6th. He was a longstanding leader in international relations. So at 88 Joseph Nye, Joe to most in the international relations community, passed away.

Joe was notable for many things, but possibly most notably his leadership at Harvard and his determination to move from academia to policy making and back. Probably best known for his creation and application of ‘soft power’, especially with respect the United States, he represented the best of international relations thought and application. His career was close to singular. As described in the NYTimes by Trip Gabriel:

“Sometimes considered the dean of American political science, Mr. Nye led the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and held senior jobs in the Carter and Clinton administrations.”

He was appointed deputy under secretary of state from 1977 to 1979. He returned to office with President Clinton serving in 1993 as chair of the National Intelligence Council. In 1994, he was appointed assistant secretary for international security affairs at the Pentagon.

On the academic side Joe joined the Harvard faculty in 1964, and he became dean of the Kennedy School of Government from 1995 to 2004.

Joe was probably best known for the concept he proposed and advanced throughout much of his career – ‘soft power’. As Trip Gabriel pointed out:

“Mr. Nye developed the concept of soft power in the late 1980s to explain how America’s ability to get other nations to do what it wanted rested on more than the power of its military or economy; it also derived from American values.”

“Soft power tools include diplomacy, economic assistance and trustworthy information, such as that provided in Voice of America broadcasts. He laid out his thinking in a 2004 book, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.””

““Joe’s seminal book on soft power is one of the very few books by a political scientist on international relations that had an impact on the real world beyond academia,” Derek Shearer, a professor of diplomacy at Occidental College in Los Angeles, said in an email.”

Joe also promoted – it is somewhat unclear who first described it, ‘smart power’. Smart power is identified as the combination of hard power and soft power strategies. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, smart power is an “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one’s influence and establish legitimacy of one’s action.”

Joe promoted, in other words, critical strategic diplomacy and policy making. I must say I was quite lucky to enjoy his thinking and analysis. I was invited a variety of times by my mentor Richard Rosecarnce to the The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard where later in his career he ‘hung his hat’. The Belfer Center is the hub of Harvard Kennedy School’s research, teaching, and training in international security and diplomacy, environment and natural resource issues, and science and technology policy. Rosecrance would include me in various US-China and US-Middle East gatherings. Joe Nye was almost always present and I was thoroughly impressed by his insights and his very congenial involvement in all the discussions we held. He will be sadly missed but one of his final thoughts on President Trump is worth repeating:

““I’m afraid President Trump doesn’t understand soft power,” Mr. Nye told CNN in an interview days before his death. “Think back on the Cold War — American nuclear deterrence and American troops in Europe were crucial. But when the Berlin Wall went down, it didn’t go down under a barrage of artillery. It went down under hammers and bulldozers wielded by people whose minds had been changed by the Voice of America and the BBC.””

I would also refer to the insight on Nye from colleagues at the The Wire China, Haitong Du, Margaret Siu, Brian Wong, Chengkai Xie, and Duo Yi:

“Nye’s influence was not merely conceptual; it was lived — and is lived. He reshaped how we study power, and how we reckon with the responsibility it entails. He also taught us that values endure beyond individual leaders, and can transcend institutions. He reminded us, time and time again, that the world needs morally sound and resonant universal tenets for effective global leadership.”

“He cautioned us — gently, firmly — against over-reliance on historical analogy. Determinism and fatalism, he warned, are no guides to the future. Truth is more complex than polarisation. And through it all, Nye showed that strategic thinking demands not just expertise, but prudent judgement of knowing when to act, when to hold back, and what principles must endure.”

And finally an opening statement from the PS and its editors:

“Just a few decades ago, the world understood power in one way: as the ability to secure one’s desired outcomes using coercion, intimidation, or payoffs. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., changed all that in the late 1980s, when he introduced the idea of “soft power” to describe the use of attraction to advance one’s interests and, later, when he devised the concept of “smart power” (which combines soft power with traditional “hard” power).”

Now I had planned to turn to the rather sad state of the UN as it approaches Year80. A focus on fading multilateralism. But I was called off that for the moment because of a serious back and forth between the Trump administration and the government of South Africa led by President Cyril Ramaphosa. Now South Africa holds the presidency of the G20 in this current year and President Trump has attacked the South African government for supposedly expropriating without compensation land from South African Afrikaners. Just this week Politico reported that the United States admitted a number of white South Africans to the United States:

“A group of 49 Afrikaners claiming to face discrimination and economic hardship in their home country arrived to the U.S. on Monday morning after being awarded an expedited pathway into the country by the Trump administration under a new program established earlier this year.”

As I noted in a previous Post here at Alan’s Newsletter, the Trump administration has ‘penalized’ South Africa with both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent declining to attend the first G20 ministerial gatherings for foreign ministers and for finance ministers.

But it seems that is not where it has ended and there continue to be hints that Trump might not attend the Summit. As reported by Jeff Stein and John Hiudson at WAPO:

“The White House National Security Council has ordered U.S. agencies and departments to suspend work with the Group of 20 conference set to be hosted by South Africa this year, according to two people familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe a government decision not yet made public.”

“The move follows President Donald Trump’s public threats to boycott the summit over claims that White South Africans are having their land taken away by the government under a new expropriation law.”

“How could we be expected to go to South Africa for the very important G-20 Meeting when Land Confiscation and Genocide is the primary topic of conversation?” Trump wrote on Truth Social in April. “They are taking the land of white Farmers, and then killing them and their families.”

While South Africa and its President, Cyril Ramaphosa, have rebutted Trump and his allegations, it would seem that the South African President has decided to try and ‘clear the air’ and set relations on a ‘better track’ – possibly getting Trump to agree to attend the Summit in November. As reported in AlJazeera:

“South African President Cyril Ramaphosa will meet United States President Donald Trump at the White House next week in an attempt to “reset” ties between the two countries, Pretoria has said.”

“The president’s visit to the US provides a platform, hopefully, to reset the strategic relationship between the two countries,” it added, saying the trip will take place from Monday to Thursday and the two leaders will meet on Wednesday.”

“The White House had no immediate comment on the meeting, which would be Trump’s first with the leader of an African nation since he returned to office in January.”

If we are right, Ramaphosa’s trip to the US is designed to secure assurances of Trump’s G20 South Africa Summit attendance and US involvement in the myriad of Ministerial gatherings, Working Group efforts and Task Force ones for the annual G20 Summit. If so, and his efforts succeed, a strong sigh of relief will be expressed I suspect by all G20 members. Success of US attendance will also help to secure US hosting for the 2026 G20 Summit. A further sigh of relief I anticipate.

Image Credit: Munk Debates

Is there Order? The Growing Confusion

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As we’ve already pointed out in a previous Substack Post from Alan’s Newsletter, focusing on Trump’s dramatic tariffs, reveals a growing global order confusion. Do we have a continuing ‘great power competition’ – the United States, Russia and China, key great powers butting heads whether in Ukraine, or Gaza or Taiwan and the South China Seas? Or, do we see with Trump 2.0 the emergence of a ‘great power collusion’? The ‘Big Boys’ establishing and maintaining ‘spheres of interest’. Or, just possibly are we enveloped currently in an international system where great power actions do little to constrain disorder. Indeed, their actions only add to the confusion and disorder in a highly conflict prone international system. The problem of course is that analysts are biased toward seeing some form of order where in fact it is just as likely none exists.

In this earlier Post on global order we quoted Stacie Goddard who has raised the contending competition versus collusion order dynamic:

“Now look it won’t stop analysts – both those determined to extract a logic and those likely not to, to keep examining the Trump policy action. Indeed I was attracted to the piece prepared by Stacie Goddard in Foreign Affairs (FA), “The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition: Trump’s New Spheres of Influence”. Now Goddard in the piece tackled the view that Trump’s strategic actions were driven by great power competition – a view adopted by many realist thinkers who see this as Trump’s logic focusing on US ‘interests’ in contrast to other administrations that have focused on ‘values’ and ‘collective global governance action’. As Goddard writes:

 

“But in the mid-2010s, a new consensus took hold. The era of cooperation was over, and U.S. strategy had to focus on Washington’s contests with its major rivals, China and Russia. The main priority of American foreign policy was clear: stay ahead of them.”

 

“Some hailed this consensus on great-power competition; others lamented it. But as Russia amped up its aggression in Ukraine, China made clear its designs on Taiwan, and the two autocratic powers deepened their ties and collaborated more closely with other U.S. rivals, few predicted that Washington would abandon competition as its guiding light. As Trump returned to the White House in 2025,many analysts expected continuity: a “Trump-Biden-Trump foreign policy,” as the title of an essay in Foreign Affairs described it.”

 

“Then came the first two months of Trump’s second term. With astonishing speed, Trump has shattered the consensus he helped create. Rather than compete with China and Russia, Trump now wants to work with them, seeking deals that, during his first term, would have seemed antithetical to U.S. interests.”

 

“These interpretations might have been persuasive in January. But it should now be clear that Trump’s vision of the world is not one of great-power competition but of great-power collusion: a “concert” system akin to the one that shaped Europe during the nineteenth century.”

“In Trump’s vision of a new concert, Russia and China must be treated as kindred spirits in quelling rampant disorder and worrisome social change. The United States will continue to compete with its peers, especially with China on issues of trade, but not at the expense of aiding the forces that Trump and his vice president, JD Vance, have called “enemies within”: illegal immigrants, Islamist terrorists, “woke” progressives, European-style socialists, and sexual minorities.”

But to determine the dynamic of the current international system, notwithstanding these classic global order structures just described by Goddard, there is the continuing, indeed possibly the rising mayhem in the international system. Switch for a moment to South Asia where we have just seen India’s ‘retaliation’ for an attack on Indian tourists in Kashmir. As reported in the NYTimes:

“India said early Wednesday that it had conducted several airstrikes on Pakistan, hailing a victory in the name of vengeance for the terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians in Kashmir last month.”

 

“The Indian government said its forces had struck nine sites in Pakistan and on Pakistan’s side of the disputed Kashmir region, in what it described as retaliation for a terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians in Kashmir.”

“But in recent years, particularly after both built deterrence through nuclear weapons in the 1990s, their military confrontations had been limited to largely along their border regions. While India in recent years has struck Pakistan-administered Kashmir and areas close to it during periods of rising tensions, the attack on Wednesday included strikes on Punjab, in mainland Pakistan, for the first time in more than half a century.” …

 

““The terrorist attack was one of the worst against Indian civilians in decades, and India was quick to suggest that Pakistan, its neighbor and archenemy, had been involved. The two countries have fought several wars over Kashmir, a region that they have split but that each claims in whole.””

The dilemma in this conflict between the two South Asian rivals is the absence of strong efforts to tamp down the conflict:

“Still, a major factor in the de-escalation of past India-Pakistan crises was international pressure brought to bear on both sides. And with Washington distracted and few other mutually trusted “honest brokers” available, that means it could be up to the two parties themselves to find an off-ramp.”

To say the least, that is troubling and seems to signal, not surprisingly, that a global order framing is at best a stretch in the current global environment. Nathan Gardels of the Berggruen Institute underlines the contingencies that haunt the current order in a recent Noema piece:

“In short, history is open in all directions. There is no through line you can draw that will tell us where it will all go and where it will end up. There are a multitude of possibilities and arrays of conditions everywhere, all at once, that will only have looked inevitable in retrospect.”

 

“Coherence and equilibrium are “the momentary exception” in the random swirl of disequilibrium that is the rule.”

“This understanding of the indeterminate direction of history not only departs from the modern paradigm of historical progression rooted in Judeo-Christian eschatology, or theology of destiny, but embraces its opposite in the “principle of reverse movement.” History can go forward, backward or sideways.”

Yup, forward, backward or even sideways. There might be order but in the face of a quixotic Trump administration and pugilistic Putin regime we may be stretching the notion of ‘order’ framing. Meanwhile, efforts by the EU and many member states to gather their collective will to take on their own defense – build policies that generate ‘sovereign autonomy’ with significantly less reliance on the US starting with Ukraine but building an independent European deterrence has become a subject. Richard Youngs, a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe has described this potential turning point. In a CEIP article he describes this ‘moment of truth:

“Writers, analysts, think tankers, journalists, and commentators seem to agree. A standard narrative has emerged that Europe faces a “moment of truth” and that “innovative formulas” are needed to advance European interests. Some insist that the crisis moment “has reignited a dormant sense of European purpose” or that “a different kind of Europe” is emerging in 2025. Others feel that Trump has already unleashed a new era of deeper European cooperation. A common view is that as the EU moves to “transform the way we protect ourselves, “this will “force a radical rethinking . . . of the nature of the EU.” In other words, deeper integration across the board will be needed to sustain Europe’s military buildup. The Economist believes that a “radical rethinking of how European nations confederate” may be emerging.”

Richard Samans, who is a Nonresident Senior Fellow – Global Economy and Development, Center for Sustainable Development at Brookings in a piece titled, “Rebalancing the world economy: Right idea but wrong approach”, suggests that Europe can/should act with the US and China to fix what he sees as an unbalanced global economy:

“The Trump administration’s norm-busting actions are a wake-up call that the contradictions and tensions in the system are unsustainable, extending well beyond trade rules. A Plaza/Louvre Accord or Bretton Woods-like moment appears to be approaching one way or the other, most likely during this or the next U.S. administration and quite possibly later this year.”

 

“Yes, Europe currently has its hands full developing a new defense strategy and helping to reach a responsible and durable resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. But its defense-related fiscal spending plans give it a strategic, first-mover advantage in an international macroeconomic coordination negotiation aimed at reducing economic imbalances. In particular, Germany’s long overdue relaxation of its debt brake has given Europe crucial new table stakes, reversing decades of history in which Germany’s fiscal posture prevented Europe from playing a leadership role in such settings.”

Europe seems to be a key actor, and more critically, Germany’s stepping up to a key organizing role in Europe is vital. Yet that is exactly what appears to be the problem. Yes, changing the debt brake and encouraging the new German coalition of CDU/CSU -SPD to take a more dramatic European leaders’ role is front and centre in Europe but the emergence of Friedrich Merz as the coalition’s new Chancellor posted an uninvited warning sign. As described in WPR:

“Instead, it became a nailbiter, in large part because the investiture vote is a secret ballot, allowing members of Merz’ coalition to vote against him or abstain in protest. And indeed, they did, with Merz falling six votes short of the 316 needed in the first vote despite his CDU-SPD coalition holding 328 seats. And in the second round, he still only reached 325 votes. Of course, because of the nature of the ballot, it remains unclear if the dissension to his leadership is coming from his own CDU—which is known to have rival factions—or from members of the SPD.”

 

“Regardless, it suggests that Merz’s coalition, already one of the slimmest majorities seen in postwar Germany, is even more fragile than previously assumed. That gives him less room to maneuver in implementing his party’s agenda, and considering that Merz had already shown signs of abrasiveness as a leader, the dissension bodes poorly for future votes. It also hands the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, even more ammunition to throw at his leadership and the country’s mainstream parties.”

 

“More broadly, the turmoil today came after months in which Merz had signaled he was prepared to return Germany to its historically strong leadership position in Europe, even scheduling trips to Paris and Warsaw for tomorrow before even securing the chancellorship. At a time of heightened global uncertainty and a power vacuum in EU affairs, Merz’s proactive and muscular moves to reestablish German influence even prior to taking office had been more than welcomed in Brussels and other European capitals. The events of today, though, suggest that those expectations may have been too high and the enthusiasm premature—not the first time that has been the case for Berlin in recent years”

Still Merz seemed to have gathered himself and set off for meetings with European colleagues. As described by by Roger Cohen in the NYTimes:

“Taking office as Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz headed straight for Paris on Wednesday to meet with Mr. Macron. The two leaders are united in seeking what Mr. Merz has called “independence” and what Mr. Macron calls “strategic autonomy” from Washington, a dramatic shift. Writing in the French daily Le Figaro, they said they “will never accept an imposed peace and will continue to support Ukraine against Russian aggression.””

Still the path forward for Europe and others is not clear. Roger Cohen makes that clear:

“But Europe is scarcely united, whatever the resolve in Paris and Berlin. The nationalist, anti-immigrant, anti-climate-science, anti-transgender wave that swept Mr. Trump into office last year is also potent across a continent where it has empowered Viktor Orban in Hungary and Giorgia Meloni in Italy, among others.”

With Trump 2.0 in play the global order dynamics are confused and incomplete. Europe still needs to show its unity and purpose if strategic autonomy is to become a thing. For now, the global order dynamic may just be wishful thinking.

Image Credit” DW News

This Post first appeared at my Substack as a Post there –

Is there Order? The Growing Confusion – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/is-there-order-the-growing-confusion

What is This? Trump and His Tariffs

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With the 100 days now reached, and just passed by Trump and his second administration, there is a desperate search to uncover a logic and goal or goals in Trump’s return to the White House and his most pointed policy action – the imposition of tariffs for all. I must say, it is not easy.

 

Now where to begin. I must say I am partial to David Brooks and his insights into Trump and his actions.  And sure enough he gave us a view recently in the NYTimes in a piece entitled, ‘Trump’s Single Stroke of Brilliance”: 

“Some of this is inherent in President Trump’s nature. He is not a learned man, but he is a spirited man, an assertive man. The ancient Greeks would say he possesses a torrential thumos, [passion]  a burning core of anger, a lust for recognition. All his life, he has moved forward with new projects and attempted new conquests, despite repeated failures and bankruptcies that would have humbled a nonnarcissist.”

 

“Initiative depends on motivation. The Trump administration is driven by some of the most atavistic and powerful of all human desires: resentment, the desire for power, the desire for retribution.”

Well, I must say, the resentment is pretty evident. But it still leaves rather unclear the possible, if it can be found, a Trump strategic logic. Many opinion folk are trying. Though there are so many initial policy actions by way of Trump’s ‘Executive Orders’ – indeed it seems to be a record for an incoming President – actions against immigrants, especially deportation actions, universities, research initiatives, development assistance, and much much more. Still nothing seems to be more dramatic than Trump tariffs. And the search is on, just as it is elsewhere, for a logic for the dramatic global imposition of wide-ranging tariffs.

Peter Warr prepared a piece for the East Asia Forum (EAF)  that attempts to crystallize, if possible, a Trump tariff policy logic. Warr is the John Crawford Professor of Agricultural Economics Emeritus at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University (ANU) and Visiting Professor of Development Economics at the National Institute for Development Administration, Bangkok. Here is his first statement on the logic of Trump tariffs: 

“He is imposing huge tariffs on the countries most vulnerable to them, then waiting to exploit the new position of strength to make demands. The uncertainty and fear they generate are not byproducts — they are the point, establishing the leverage Trump needs for the predatory negotiations that follow.” 

So, it is about gaining leverage over allies and adversaries alike. As Warr suggests:   

“The tariffs are surely harmful, even from a US perspective, but they are not ‘crazy’. Given the way Trump sees the world and himself, they almost make sense.” 

But then it becomes clear that the actual tariff levels imposed are not particularly sensible: 

“In his Rose Garden speech, Trump revealed supposed figures for ‘tariffs charged to the USA including currency manipulation and trade barriers’ and ‘USA discounted reciprocal tariffs’. The numbers mystified observers until analysts including James Surowiecki worked out that they reflected each country’s goods trade surplus with the United States as a percentage of their goods exports to the United States — with a minimum 10 per cent tariff imposed on all countries, even those with trade deficits.”

Now Warr, accepts that many analysts think the calculations from the administration are not sensible: 

“As an estimate of protection rates against US goods, this calculation is absurd. Surowiecki called the formula ‘surprisingly silly’, and economist Paul Krugman called it ‘completely crazy’. But is it?”

So, Warr suggests there may in fact be a certain logic. The tariffs are designed, according to Warr to target those most vulnerable to Trump leverage: 

“The critics missed the point that the formula attempts a rudimentary indication of countries’ vulnerability to US tariffs. Countries receiving the highest tariffs have the highest ratio of exports relative to imports from the United States, even if they have no restrictions against US goods, tariffs or otherwise.” 

Though he attempts to highlight a certain logic – targeting what he sees as those with significant vulnerability to the US, in the end Warr has to concede that the approach is not exactly optimal: 

“A better, but still approximate, measure of that vulnerability would have been gross exports to the United States divided by a country’s GDP, but that would produce much smaller tariffs, which presumably is why it was not used. This may also explain why services were excluded from the formula. The United States is a net importer of goods but a net exporter of services and it is much harder to levy tariffs on services than goods. Placing a country’s trade surplus with the United States in the numerator falsely suggests that the tariffs reduce the US trade deficit.” 

 

“All these simplistic formulae still overlook the fact that countries have differing alternative, non-US export opportunities. They also ignore the effect of global value chains, with products crossing international borders multiple times during production. Reported trade balances misleadingly record the final assembly point as the source of US imports.” 

Recognizing that the formula for tariffs is ‘simplistic’ Warr is left a bottom line that acknowledges only that Trump is a ‘protectionist’: 

“Trump is a protectionist. He sees the decline of US manufacturing as foreigners stealing US jobs — grievance politics gone global. He thinks tariffs might reverse that.”

 

“Trump is a dealmaker. By ‘deal’ he means a zero-sum transaction in which one party wins at the expense of the other. Trump is obsessed with winning and believes tariffs can create coercive bargaining power for the United States as a major importer.” 

 

“Trump’s deal-making strategy is now transparent. First, enact huge tariffs on the countries most vulnerable to the US. Then wait for their desperate leaders to call, pleading for special treatment. Then exploit the new position of strength to demand something he wants.” 

It is not much of a strategic logic as Warr accepts in the end:

“This is the outlook Trump brings to trade policy. To respond most effectively to the tariffs, their function must first be recognised. The uncertainty and fear they produce is their essential purpose, establishing the bargaining power he requires for the predatory negotiations that follow.” 

In fact I am more inclined to see Trump’s tariffs in the way described by Alan Beattie of the FT. Beattie was previously the FT’s international economy editor and world trade editor and these days he writes ‘Trade Secrets’.The title of his opinion says a lot: “Vision of a Trump master plan is fading in a storm of incoherence. As Beattie writes: 

“The weeks and months since Donald Trump took office — in fact since he was elected — have seen companies, foreign governments, commentators and the media play the somewhat frustrating game of Hunt The Rationale.”

 

“They have watched a dizzying carousel of tariffs being threatened and then delayed, or imposed and then lifted, or imposed only to be shot through with loopholes.” 

 

“Over time, the ranks of those claiming there’s a master plan have thinned — and their arguments have grown less persuasive. Increasingly it has become obvious that there is no plan, or at least no coherent plan with a single target and a way of hitting it. Instead, Trump’s tariff policy reflects a mixture of competing and often flat-out contradictory aims and a misunderstanding of the power of the crude instruments he is using.” 

 

“All at once, he appears to be trying to cut trade deficits, protect US manufacturing, boost federal revenues, bring down other countries’ tariffs by offering deals, coerce them into a variety of actions (including allowing the US to annex Greenland or Canada), extract favours for granting exceptions to US companies, and keep the spotlight squarely on himself. The chaos surrounding his tariff policy is not just ineptitude — it is the result of huge contradictions.” 

Now look it won’t stop analysts – both those determined to extract a logic and those likely not to, to keep examining the Trump policy action. Indeed I was attracted to the piece prepared by Stacie Goddard in Foreign Affairs  (FA), “The Rise and Fall of Great-Power Competition: Trump’s New Spheres of Influence”. Now Goddard in the piece tackled the view that Trump’s strategic actions were driven by great power competition – a view adopted by many realist thinkers who see this as Trump’s logic focusing on US ‘interests’ in contrast to other administrations that have focused on ‘values’ and ‘collective global governance action’. As Goddard writes: 

“But in the mid-2010s, a new consensus took hold. The era of cooperation was over, and U.S. strategy had to focus on Washington’s contests with its major rivals, China and Russia. The main priority of American foreign policy was clear: stay ahead of them.” 

 

“Some hailed this consensus on great-power competition; others lamented it. But as Russia amped up its aggression in Ukraine, China made clear its designs on Taiwan, and the two autocratic powers deepened their ties and collaborated more closely with other U.S. rivals, few predicted that Washington would abandon competition as its guiding light. As Trump returned to the White House in 2025,many analysts expected continuity: a “Trump-Biden-Trump foreign policy,” as the title of an essay in Foreign Affairs described it.” 

 

“Then came the first two months of Trump’s second term. With astonishing speed, Trump has shattered the consensus he helped create. Rather than compete with China and Russia, Trump now wants to work with them, seeking deals that, during his first term, would have seemed antithetical to U.S. interests.” 

 

“These interpretations might have been persuasive in January. But it should now be clear that Trump’s vision of the world is not one of great-power competition but of great-power collusion: a “concert” system akin to the one that shaped Europe during the nineteenth century.”

 

“In Trump’s vision of a new concert, Russia and China must be treated as kindred spirits in quelling rampant disorder and worrisome social change. The United States will continue to compete with its peers, especially with China on issues of trade, but not at the expense of aiding the forces that Trump and his vice president, JD Vance, have called “enemies within”: illegal immigrants, Islamist terrorists, “woke” progressives, European-style socialists, and sexual minorities.”

Now digging back 200 years to describe a political order that might raise similarities to the actions of today’s Trump actions and others is intriguing but not strongly convincing. Leave aside the dangers of historical comparison, and there are many, the problem here  is imposing strategic logic to a not very strategic actor. We’ve already seen it with his major initiative, tariffs. And, moreover, there is little to suggest that the other major actors accept and act in a concert-like manner. There is too much unilateral unconcert-like action.

But let’s keep our eye on Trump’s collaborative initiatives, if they are in fact there and determine whether great power collusion is in fact an operative framing for Trump 2.0 global order actions. Paint me skeptical.

Image Credit: NBC News

This Post first appeared at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/162614458/share-center

G20 Collaborative Actions: With or Without the US

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The common refrain by those examining the multilateral  institutions and organizations seeking greater collaboration at the global level are: ‘legitimacy’ and ‘effectiveness’. Now the fact is these characteristics apply to the national and subnational levels as well, but they are a consistent refrain at the international level, especially in light of the geopolitical tensions in the international system. 

A number of my colleagues have recently focused on what I consider the key global informal governance institution, the G20. These colleagues focus on both critical characteristics with somewhat different views. First there is Danny Bradlow and Robert Wade. Danny Bradlow is a Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria and Senior G20 Advisor to South African Institute of International Affairs. Robert H. Wade, is co-author on this piece, and is a Professor of Global Political Economy, London School of Economics. Both have participated in various CWD events. In a piece in Global Policy entitled, “How to Fix the Representation Problem of the G20” the co-authors described briefly the G20. Some of that is worth repeating: 

“The G20 is an informal gathering, which claims to be “the premier forum for international economic cooperation”. It was established at finance minister’s level in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, and upgraded to summit level, with the same membership,  in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The summit is held annually, under the leadership of a rotating presidency.”

 

“The membership comprises 19 of the “weightiest” national economies plus the European Union and the African Union. The 19 national economies include  the G7 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada), Australia, plus China, India,  Indonesia, Republic of Korea,  Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina.   The group, which includes about 10% of the states in the world, accounts for 67% of the world’s population, 85% of global GDP, and 75% of global trade.” 

 

It is in size and the weight of membership the most formidable of what I call the Informals which includes at least  the G7, the BRICS+ and the G20. When it then comes to an evaluation of this key Informal the authors suggest: 

“The G20 has had a mixed record.  It has an intense work programme  focused on addressing many of the most significant international economic, financial, environmental and social challenges. The consistency in G20 membership has proven to be an advantage because it helps foster a sense of familiarity and understanding at the technical level among the permanent members, which is helpful in times of crisis and in dealing with complex problems.”

 

“But its exclusivity and informal status has limited its ability to address these challenges. This is particularly  because in many cases an effective response requires agreement and action by all states.” 

 

“Over time, as tensions in international relations have grown, the shortcomings in the structure of the G20 have become more evident. Despite its economic weight, the G20 has a basic legitimacy problem.  It is a self-selected group whose members, except for the African Union and the European Union, represent only themselves. 

What these authors then suggest, in light of their view that legitimacy is lacking is to adopt a model being used, in this case, at the Financial Stability Board, the FSB: 

“It has established six Regional Consultative Groups (RCGs), one each for the Americas, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan region. The objective is to expand and formalize the FSB’s outreach activities beyond the G20 membership and better reflect the global character of the financial system.”

They conclude their examination with this perspective: 

“Applying the FSB model to the G20 would allow the current members of the G20 membership to continue, while obliging them to establish a consultation process with regional neighbours, thereby creating a limited form of representation for all the world’s states. It would also establish a limited form of G20 accountability towards the international community.”

It is evident that these authors believe the problem for the G20 is a lack of wide representation and apparently the need to enlarge G20 representation. Yet it is somewhat surprising that these two colleagues target representation. I’ve always been of the view that you go with the members you have and seek to move ‘the policy dials’. Whether it is multilateral or minilateral or plurilateral, in an ideal world we would probably enlarge representation but we have learned all too unhappily that universal representation is not necessarily a solution to effective policy action. 

Two other colleagues seem less inclined to see representation as the most serious impediment to advancing G20 policymaking. Indeed these co-authors underscore the critical value of the G20. So, my CWD colleague and lead co-leader, Colin Bradfrord, a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Global Economy and Development Program at Brookings and his colleague, Brahima Sangafowa Coulibaly who is vice president and director of the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings have joined together to examine the G20 role in, “Strengthening Cooperation for a Changing World:  The Evolving Role of the G20 in Global Economic Governance”, a special brief for Brookings and in fact Brookings held a session with a number of esteemed panelists in Washington at the margins of the ‘Spring Meetings’ to examine the G20. As they argue in their Executive Summary:

“While there are areas for improvement, a review of the G20’s evolution highlights a remarkable transformation. From an ad hoc response to the GFC [GlobalFinancial Crisis], it has evolved into a central pillar of international cooperation—shaping global trajectories across finance, economics, technology, health, climate, and society. After 18 years of experience, involving tens of thousands of politicians, policymakers, and societal leaders throughout each year, the G20 has demonstrated that it is indeed “fit for purpose” at this crucial moment of competing perspectives on the global future.

 

“Indeed, the world is undergoing one of the most profound transformations in global economic relations and facing the greatest test of international governance since World War II. In this context, the G20 has proven to be an indispensable platform—not only through its annual leaders’ summits but also through its multilayered, yearlong process involving ministers, sherpas, senior officials, and civil society leaders across a wide range of sectors. Its ability to convene nations with vastly different cultures, interests, and perspectives—and to keep them at the table despite tensions, rivalries, or even war—is one of its greatest strengths. The G20 serves as a vital arena where global governance plays out in real time amid deep uncertainty and geopolitical strain.”

Are matters perfect, of course not. And the authors are alert to point to the limitations: 

“Despite its past success, there is room to enhance the G20’s effectiveness and impact. Key areas for improvement include strengthening personal dynamics among leaders; enhancing continuity and sustained engagement; improving public communication and domestic outreach; and restoring public confidence in leadership and markets. To bolster its credibility, the G20 should also revisit practices from its most effective years—particularly the use of action-oriented communiqués with clear timelines.”

Critically on the plus side the G20 has a significant element of inclusiveness – at least politically. Not only do you have all the members of the G7 but you also have all the original BRICS members, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Critical in my mind, and it seems to be as well for the co-authors, the G20 includes many key actors from the Global South:

“Third, around the same time, the rise of large, dynamic emerging market economies (EMEs) dramatically altered the global economic landscape, reducing the long-standing dominance of the West—namely the United States and Europe—and ushering in a more pluralistic world. This shift integrated key non-Western powers, such as China and Russia along with influential voices from the Global South, into global economic decisionmaking, injecting realism along with tensions into the global governance system.”

In addition, and to aid continuity from year-to-year for the G20 in the face of  passing of the presidency to the next G20 member, the co-authors point to the Troika: 

“Each annual summit marks a formal transition between presidencies, but continuity is ensured through a “troika” system, comprising the past, current, and incoming hosts. At the outset of a presidency, the host country announces its priorities, which are then integrated with ongoing legacy issues. Together, these form the foundation of the annual work plan, which is refined during the first sherpa and deputies’ meetings— typically held in December and January—and officially endorsed at the first finance ministers’ meeting. This process sets the structure for and establishes working groups and ministerial responsibilities.” 

Is it perfect, no. Indeed in the recommendations section the co-authors suggest adding more members to enhance continuity. But the co-authors pay attention to the structure, what I’ve referred to as the ‘Iceberg Theory’ of the G20. The Iceberg is the significant structure of political and administrative actors carrying on the year to year work, maintaining a critical element of continuity,  to move policy actions forward: 

“This expansive framework highlights the G20’s evolution into a dynamic platform for global governance with broad consultations that extend well beyond its core membership. G20 summits are not simply a two-day gathering of world leaders; they are the culmination of a yearlong process involving a wide array of ministerial meetings, working groups, and civil society dialogues aimed at steering the global economy and addressing 21st century challenges.[In fact the significant structure of Ministerials, Working Groups and Task Forces can be reviewed here at the Global Summitry Project (GSP) website].  

Is it  enough? Well, here you have to be a bit cautious. Overall, the representation and structure of today’s G20 seems adequate but with respect to ‘effectiveness’ – collective concerted collaboration – there is still a distance to go. Very much so. The co-authors in fact also urge the following: 

  • “Strengthen personal dynamics among leaders
  •  Enhance continuity and sustain engagement
  • Improve public communication and domestic engagement
  • Restore public confidence in leadership and markets”

All of that would be useful but collective determined policymaking – advancing action on climate change and climate financing, debt management and relief, global development and many more subjects – remain seemingly unreachable at the moment. 

And now, with the completion of the South Africa year we come to the end of the first cycle of G20 countries. That means that the United States is scheduled to return to hosting in 2026. The Trump administration’s distaste for multilateral actions including debt support, climate change, global development are all too evident. While there was talk in fact of the Trump administration deciding not to take up leadership for 2026, that may not be what the Trump administration is deciding to do at the moment. I wonder which is better however: with, or without, the US? I’m not sure. Some see the Summit collapsing without US involvement. But US hosting, with a Trump administration, may collapse forward movement in key global governance policies. There is at the moment no definitive answer. But there will be more to come on this.  

Credit Image: Bahrain

This Post originally appeared asa Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/g20-collaborative-actions-with-or